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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL WOODARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
W. BRENT JENSEN, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD SEVERIN and 
MRS. RICHARD SEVERIN 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 870346 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The appellant is herein referred to as Woodard and the 
respondents, Richard Severin and Mrs. Richard Severin, are referred 
to as the Severins. W. Brent Jensen, the defendant and third-
party plaintiff, who is the seller named in the land sale agreement 
dated September 21, 1972, is referred to as Jensen. 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Utah Court 
of Appeals on the granting of Woodard's petition for writ of 
certiorari. This brief is filed pursuant to a letter from the 
Supreme Court, dated March 24, 1988, granting twenty days from 
such date to file a proper brief of appellant. Rule 48(b) of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court authorizes the filing of a brief 
after the granting of a petition for writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Woodard is entitled to the reformation and 
specific performance of the 1972 agreement to purchase land. 
2. Whether Woodard is entitled to the land in dispute 
as against the Severins who had actual notice of Woodard1s interest. 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to 
order reversal for the failure of the trial court to make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law on all material issues. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, provides: 
"Recording necessary to impart notice -
Operation and effect - Interest of person 
not named in instrument. 
"Every conveyance of real estate, and 
every instrument of writing setting forth 
an agreement to convey any real estate or 
whereby any real estate may be affected, to 
operate as notice to third persons shall be 
proved or acknowledged and certified in the 
manner prescribed by this title and recorded 
in the office of the recorder of the county 
in which such real estate is situated, but 
shall be valid and binding between the parties 
thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, 
certification or record, and as to all other 
persons who have had actual noticed Neither 
the fact that an instrument, recorded as here-
in provided, recites only a nominal considera-
tion, nor the fact that the grantee in such 
instrument is designated as trustee, or that 
the conveyance otherwise purports to be in 
trust without naming the beneficiaries or 
stating the terms of the trust, shall operate 
to charge any third person with notice of the 
interest of any person or persons not named 
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in such instrument or of the grantor or grant-
ors; but the grantee may convey the fee or 
such lesser interest as was conveyed to him 
by such instrument free and clear of all claims 
not disclosed by the instrument or by an in-
strument recorded as herein provided setting 
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specify-
ing the interest claimed and describing the 
property charged with such interest/' 
(Emphasis Added) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a suit for reformation and specific performance 
of a 1972 agreement between Jensen, seller, and Woodard, buyer, 
for the sale of five (5) acres of land, in which the legal descrip-
tion of the land sold was erroneous due to a mutual mistake of 
fact. 
During or about September 1972, Woodard and Jensen met 
and discussed the purchase by Woodard of a five-acre parcel of 
land. (R. 287) The land is in the mountains, about eight miles 
from Wanship, West of Echo Canyon, near subdivisions of lots for 
cabin sites. At the time of the meeting the land was unsurveyed 
and unimproved by buildings or other structures. Jensen told 
Woodard that no land in the area had been sold and that he, Wood-
ard, could buy any five-acre parcel. Woodard selected a parcel 
(R. 318) and he and Jensen indicated a corner with a pile of 
rocks. (R. 288) 
Jensen, with Woodard's help, prepared a document entitled 
"Agreement", dated September 21, 1972, a copy of which is attached 
hereto and is marked Appendix "A". Pages 27 - 28. (R. 289, 
290, 316-319). There was an oral agreement at the time the 
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parties met on the five-acre parcel that Woodard could buy any 
five-acre parcel as long as he kept the lines straight. (R. 318) 
Jensen prepared the legal description. (R. 320) 
On the day the agreement was signed, Woodard paid to 
Jensen $7,000. cash on the purchase price (R. 290), and delivered 
to him 6000 shares of ADAK Corporation stock (R. 291). He later 
delivered title to a pick-up truck to Jensen. (R. 291) In a 
promissory note dated December 8, 1973, (Appendix "B", page 29 )> 
Jensen agreed to dig the footings and basement for the Woodard 
cabin. (See Exhibit 21-P and R. 291-294) In August of 1973, 
Jensen's employees dug the footings and basement and Woodard 
installed an "I" beam, put on decking, and prepared the cabin for 
the first floor level. (R. 294) (See also Exhibits 22-P, 23-P, 
24-P, 25-P, 26-P, and 27-P consisting of checks for material and 
labor which support Woodardfs testimony as to when the cabin was 
constructed). 
The legal description in the agreement is of land in 
the Southwest quarter of Section 28, Township 1 North, Range 4 
East, SLB&M, and the land selected by Woodard, which he believed 
to be accurately described, was actually in the Northwest quarter 
of Section 28. See Exhibits 18-D and overlay 18-A. Jensen ad-
mitted that he owned the North half of Section 28 in 1972 and 
that he did not own any land in the South half of the Section (R. 
476). He testified that when he prepared the description in the 
agreement, he assumed that he was describing land from the West 
quarter corner and that he had made a mistake. (R. 476, 477) 
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Woodard filed his complaint against Jensen on December 
10, 1974, for specific performance of the Agreement dated September 
21, 1972. (Appendix "An and R. 2-5) He sought a deed to the 
real estate described in paragraph 1 and in Note No. 1 of the 
Agreement. In his separate answer, Jensen admitted that he did 
sell to Woodard the real estate described in paragraph 3 of the 
agreement and gave Woodard a first right and option to purchase 
other property "....when said property was properly recorded,". 
(R. 10, 11) 
The first reference in the file to the mutual mistake 
of fact in deeding to Severin the land previously sold to Woodard 
appears in a report of a pre-trial settlement conference dated 
June 1, 1979, where it is stated: 
"It appears that from representations of 
Counsel that the defendant in a mutual mistake 
of fact deeded the property which is the sub-
ject matter of this action to one Richard 
Severin. It appears to the Court that in 
order that this matter may be settled once and 
for all, that the defendants should file a 
third party complaint against Severin to set 
the deed aside on the basis that it was given 
in error. Counsel have represented that the 
contract with the plaintiff was entered into 
prior to the time that the property was deeded 
to Mr. Severin. However, the contract was not 
recorded. Therefore, upon motion of Mr. Adams 
and the concurrence of Mr. Nygaard, the Court 
authorizes the defendants to file a third-party 
complaint against Mr. Severin to have the deed 
set aside. At such time as the case is again 
at issue, plaintiff may make application for 
a new trial date." (R. 68) 
On July 6, 1979, Jensen filed a Third Party Complaint 
against the Severins in which he admitted that he had "....mis-
takenly and erroneously conveyed right, title, and interest in 
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and to the subject real property to the Third Party Defendants....1' 
He also alleged that prior to such conveyance he had conveyed 
"....right, title, and interest to the subject real property to 
the plaintiff.11 (R. 70) In paragraph 8 he alleged: 
"The Plaintiff's right, title, and interest 
in and to the subject real property is superior 
to the Third Party Defendant's interest in and 
to the subject real property." 
He sought an order "....rescinding the mistaken portion of the 
conveyance between the defendant and the Third Party Defendants 
and conveying and quieting title to and in this mistaken portion 
to the Plaintiff." (R. 70) 
The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on April 
11, 1980, increasing the amount of damages demanded, (R. 103). A 
third amended complaint was filed on October 17, 1980, alleging 
for the first time the mistake in the description of the real 
property the parties intended to sell and purchase and upon which 
the plaintiff built his cabin. This third amended complaint 
seeks reformation of the agreement dated September 21, 1972, and 
specific performance of the agreement, as reformed, and an order 
requiring the Severins to quit claim to the plaintiff the five-
acre parcel of land on which the Woodard cabin was built. (R. 
107-111) 
In his answer to the third amended complaint, Jensen 
admitted the mistake (R. 134) and also admitted the mistake in 
his third party complaint. (R. 69, 70) Jensen also pleaded that 
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the issues between Woodard and the Severins was "....due to mutual 
mistake by both the plaintiff and defendant." (R. 180) 
The Severins started constructing a summer home in 1973 
(R. 441) about three weeks after the footings were poured on the 
Woodard cabin. (R. 303) The Severin cabin was about 250 to 300 
feet from the Woodard cabin, according to Woodardfs testimony. 
(R. 297) The relative locations of the two cabins are shown on 
Exhibit 20-D which is a map prepared by Interwest Engineering 
Corporation. Severin first saw the footings of the Woodard cabin 
in 1974. (R. 452) 
The Severins started acquiring land in the North half 
of Section 28 by a deed dated August 20, 1973, Exhibit 1-D, and 
acquired additional land in 1974, 1976, and 1977. See Exhibits 
2-D, 3-D, 5-D, D-35, and D-36. Exhibit 5-D, dated July 30, 1976, 
describing 56.01 acres, covers the land where the Woodard cabin 
is built. 
Richard Severin met Woodard in 1973 at Kent Jensen's 
cabin. (R. 301) Woodard testified that he was discussing with 
Kent Jensen getting a road cut into where he planned to build his 
cabin, and Severin said: "I hope you're not going to just build 
a shack over there, because I am going to build a nice cabin." 
(R. 302) Woodard testified that he had seen Severin a time or 
two when the footings were being poured (R. 302), and later from 
time to time about building the cabins. (R. 304) Severin did 
not interfere and never told Woodard that he owned the land. 
(R. 305, 306) Severin testified that at the time he first met 
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Woodard he was told that Woodard had an agreement to buy five 
acres of land near his property and had been told that many 
times. (R. 460-468) He said he could very well have said, 
"Don't build a shack or something," (R. 441) 
The evidence is that there is a road which was used for 
access to both the Severin and Woodard cabins across which Severin 
had constructed a gate. (R. 300) In 1977 or 1978, Severin gave 
Woodard a key to the gate. (R. 301, 470) 
Severin recalled a conversation with Woodard when he 
asked him why he was building his cabin when it wasn't his land, 
and Woodard said something to the effect that Jensen had sold him 
the land and that it was his land. (R. 466) Severin did nothing 
about it and did not seek legal advice. (R. 467) 
Despite the admissions by Jensen in his pleadings 
(R. 70, 134, 180) and in his testimony (R. 475, 476) that there 
was a mutual mistake of fact as to the location of the land in-
tended to be sold by the written agreement, Appendix "A", the 
trial court, in deciding the case in favor of the Severins, made 
no findings of fact and conclusions of law on mutual mistake of 
fact, reformation, actual notice of the 1972 Agreement by the 
Severins, and the equitable right to enforce the reformed agreement. 
In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court, stating that the equitable remedies of reformation 
and specific performance are not available in this case. Appendix 
"C", pages 30 - 34. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue between Woodard and the Severins as to the 
ownership of the five acre parcel of land erroneously described 
in the 1972 land sale agreement between Jensen, as seller, and 
Woodard, as buyer, is the only issue involved in this appeal. 
Woodard paid $7,000 cash, transferred a truck to Jensen on the 
purchase price, and took possession of the land in 1972, and he 
and Jensen partially constructed a summer home thereon. Jensen, 
with Woodardfs help, prepared the land description in the agree-
ment and, by mistake, tied it to the southwest corner of an un-
surveyed, unimproved section of mountain land instead of to the 
west quarter corner of the section. The mistake is admitted by 
Jensen in his pleadings and testimony. 
In 1976, Jensen sold to the Severins a 56.01 tract of 
land which included the five acre parcel sold to Woodard in 1972. 
Severin had notice of Woodardfs interest in the land several 
years before 1976, yet he did nothing to prevent Woodard from 
building his cabin. At a pre-trial settlement conference in 
1979, the mutual mistake of fact as to the description of the 
five-acre parcel first became evident and the trial court autho-
rized the defendants to file a third party complaint against the 
Severins to have the 1976 deed set aside. The plaintiff was 
authorized to file a third amended complaint. After being brought 
into the case, the Severins filed a pleading entitled "third 
party complaint and counterclaim" against Woodard and Jensen to 
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quiet their title to the five acre parcel. Woodard answered, 
putting in issue the respective claims of Woodard and the Sever-
ins. The judgment quieted the Severins title against Woodard and 
does not mention mutual mistake of fact, reformation, or specific 
performance of the 1972 agreement. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court, holding that the equitable remedies of refor-
mation and specific performance are not available in the instant 
case. This decision is based solely on Jensen's understanding of 
Summit County's new requirements for ,!... .recording recreational 
property11. There is no evidence in the record of any ordinance 
containing these requirements. 
Woodard contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
failing to reverse the judgment of the trial court and for its 
failure to order reformation of the agreement to correct the 
admitted mutual mistake. The Court of Appeals also erred in 
failing to order specific performance of the agreement as against 
both Jensen and the Severins. In 1976, the Severins bought the 
56.01 acre parcel, with actual notice of the 1972 Woodard-Jensen 
land sale agreement. 
The Court of Appeals further erred in failing to reverse 
the decision of the trial court, because it failed to make any 
finding of fact or conclusion of law on the issues of the intent 
of the parties to the agreement, Severin's notice of the agreement, 
mutual mistake, reformation, and specific performance. Such 




WOODARD IS ENTITLED TO REFORMATION 
AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
THE 1972 AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE LAND 
The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, quoted only the 
part of the 1972 Agreement favorable to the conclusion reached 
which relates to the recording with Summit County of Lot No. 1, 
to the purchase of Lot No. 2 in Forest Meadow Ranch, Plat C, and 
to the agreement to furnish title insurance. See Appendix "A". 
The Court significantly omitted from its opinion the following: 
ff4. The seller agrees to provide cullinary 
water to Lot No. 1 through a central water system. 
"5. The seller warrants to the buyer that a 
properly installed septic tank system will meet all 
county and state requirements for sewage disposal 
and no accessment (sic) will be made for a sewage 
hook-up« 
"6. Terms of the sale. The buyer agrees to 
pay $7,000.00 in cash and 8,000 shares of Adak 
Energy Corporation stock hereinafter referred to 
as the Stock. The seller acknowledges the stock 
is investment stock and at the present time is not 
tradable. The seller agrees that the stock will 
be held in escrow in the sellers name at the main 
office of Walker Bank & Trust, Salt Lake City, Utah 
until said stock becomes free trading. The buyer 
guarantees to the seller that the stock will have 
a market value of $1 per share on or before October 
1, 1974, and that the seller will be able to sell 
through a broker the stock for $1 a share. The 
buyer retains an option to purchase back the said 
stock for $1 per share on or before October 1, 1974." 
It was obvious error for the Court of Appeals to consi 
only a part of the agreement. "It is well established that a 
contract must be construed as a whole and the intentions of the 
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parties thereto must be collected from the entire instrument and 
not from detached portions." O'Malley Investment v Trimble, 
(Ariz 1967) 422 P2d 740. 
The Court of Appeals then decided that in the absence 
of proof that Lot No. 1 was recorded in Summit County, the condi-
tion precedent in the agreement had not been fulfilled and that, 
therefore, "....the equitable remedies of reformation and specific 
performance of the agreement are not available to Woodard." 
Appendix ,fC,f, pages 33-34. 
The decision based on this technical point ignored the 
facts recited in the statement of the case that both parties to 
the Agreement treated it as a Contract of Sale, and completely 
ignored the "unfulfilled11 condition of recording. These facts 
include: 
(1) Payment of $7,000. cash and delivery of 6,000 
shares of stock which the buyer, in paragraph 6, guaranteed would 
be worth one dollar per share by October 1, 1974. 
(2) The loan of $4,800, in December, 1972, to Jensen 
for which Jensen agreed "....to do the following items for Cecil 
Woodard's cabin: 
"1. dig and pour footings 
"2. dig basement 
"3. cut driveway 
"4. install septic tank 
,f5. to pay for all the materials and labor to 
cover the cost of items 1,2,3,4 
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"6. The items mentioned above must be done on or 
before July 1, 1973." 
See Appendix "B". 
3. The transfer by Woodard to Jensen, in December, 
1972, of a Ford truck of a value of $4,800- for payment on the 
purchase price as a substitute for the return of the shares of 
stock. (R. 291) 
4. • Jensen's employees dug the footings and basement 
in August of 1973 and Woodard installed an "I" beam, put the 
cinder block up, put the decking on top, and prepared the cabin 
for the first floor level. (R. 294) 
5. The tender by Woodard to Jensen of $3,200., the 
balance due on the purchase price. (R. 108) 
6. The admission by Jensen in several pleadings that 
there was a mutual mistake as to the legal description of the 
five acre parcel that Jensen intended to sell and Woodard intended 
to buy. (R. 69, 70, 134, and 180) 
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended 
that the parcel marked on the ground was to be sold. It is 
equally clear from the conduct of the parties, namely Jensen and 
Woodard, that the Agreement was not an option and that the parties 
did not intend that the recording of the subdivision was a control-
ling condition to the existence of the Agreement. If they intended 
otherwise, Woodard would not have paid $11,800 on the purchase 
price and they would not have built the cabin. 
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We quote from Williston on Contracts, (Jaeger) 3rd Ed., 
Vol. 4, at page 815: 
"It is said that the conduct of the parties 
is of material weight in determining what the 
parties intended in case of ambiguity, the prac-
tical construction given by the parties to the con-
tract over a period of years is persuasive. But 
when the contract is clear, the fact that the parties 
followed a different plan cannot work a revocation 
of the plain agreement. Where there is doubt as 
to the proper construction of an instrument, the 
conduct of the parties is entitled to great consid-
eration. But where its meaning is clear in the eye 
of the law, the error of the parties cannot control 
its effect11. 
In the case of Matanuska Valley Farmers Coop v. Monaghan, 
(1951) 188 F2d 906, the Court held: 
"Since the parties to the contract have in 
fact followed the method of payment from the outset 
and have made no attempt to conform to the provi-
sions of paragraph 7, they must be deemed to have 
modified the written contract by mutual agreement. 
It is well established that parties to a contract 
can, by mutual agreement, modify or rescind a con-
tract and adopt in its stead a new agreement. An 
agreement to change the terms of a contract may be 
shown by the conduct of the parties as well as by 
evidence of an explicit agreement to Modify." 
Citations in support of the foregoing include: 
3 Williston on Contracts, Sec 623, N. 6 1936; 
Whitehurst v FCX Fruit & Vegetable Service, (1944) 
224 N.C. 628, 32 SE2d 34, 39; 
City Messenger & Delivery Co. v Postal Telegraph, 
(1915) 74 Or 433, 145 P. 657; 
Saul v. Mclntyre, (1948) 57 Atl 2d 272, 274; 
Margoles v. Mollenick, (1906) 98 NYS 349. 
The Utah cases that hold that a written contract will 
be reformed to express the agreement of the parties where the 
proof of mutual mistake is clear, definite, and convincing are: 
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Peterson v. Eldredge, (1952) 122 Utah 96, 246 P2d 886; 
Sine v. Harper, (1950) 118 Utah 415, 222 P2d 571; 
Janke v. Beckstead, (1958) 8 Utah 2d 247, 332 P2d 933. 
In this case, the mutual mistake in the description of 
the land is admitted by Jensen in his pleadings. (R. 70, 134, 
180, 475, 476) The intention of the parties was to sell and 
purchase Lot No. 1, as erroneously described, and not Lot No. 2 
referred to in the Agreement. The intended lot was that marked 
on the ground with a pile of rocks on which the Woodard cabin was 
built by Woodard and Jensen's employees in 1973. The description 
was later determined by a survey and is contained in paragraph 8 
of the Third Amended Complaint. (R. 323) 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the remedies of reforma-
tion and specific performance by stating: 
"The equitable remedies of reformation and 
specific performance are not available in the 
instant case." See Appendix "C" at pages 33-34. 
No reason is given in the opinion for disregarding the 
intentions of the parties and these equitable remedies. Woodard 
paid nearly all of the purchase price for the parcel marked on 
the ground and spent thousands of dollars on the summer cabin. 




WOODARD IS ENTITLED TO THE LAND IN DISPUTE 
AGAINST THE SEVERINS WHO TOOK TITLE 
WITH ACTUAL NOTICE OF WOODARD'S INTEREST 
The Court of Appeals based its opinion entirely on the 
portion of the 1972 Agreement to the effect that there was a con-
dition precedent to the effectiveness of the Agreement, namely 
that Lot 1 had to be recorded "with Summit County". Appendix "C", 
pages 33-34. Further, the Court of Appeals, on the same pages, 
stated that after the execution of the Agreement "....Jensen dis-
covered Summit County had changed its requirements for recording 
recreational property. The new requirements, as Jensen understood 
them, made it impossible for him to subdivide and record Woodardfs 
desired property." 
There is no proof in the record of any law or ordinance 
of Summit County on the subject at all* An effort was made by 
Jensen's attorney to get Jensen's conclusion regarding restrictions 
on his right to sell in the record, and on motion, the testimony 
of Jensen was stricken. (R. 371) Absent such proof, the Agreement 
between the parties was valid. 
Section 57-1-6, UCA, quoted above, on page 2, provides 
that a contract shall be binding between the parties and without 
proofs, acknowledgment, certification, or record as to all other 
persons who have actual notice. It is true that the recorded 
agreement, with the land described as being in the wrong quarter 
section, did not, as a matter of law, give the Severins notice, 
but they took title to Woodardfs 1972 Agreement because they had 
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actual notice. There can be no doubt as to the agreement being 
binding as between Woodard and Jensen. Woodard paid in cash and 
by transfer of a truck $11,800 on a $15,000 purchase price for 
the conveyance of the five acres of land, and tendered the balance 
of $3,200, as stated in the Third Amended Complaint (R.108). 
Jensen was bound by contract to convey the land. During the 
pendency of this suit, he sold the five acre parcel to the Severins 
and conveyed it by the deed dated on July 30, 1976. (Ex. 5-D) 
The conveyance to the Severins is subject to the reformed 
1972 agreement if, on or before July 30, 1976, the Severins had 
actual notice of the Woodard agreement. 
This Court has, in several cases, considered the applica-
tion of the statute and has several times ruled on the question 
as to what constitutes actual notice. 
In the early case of Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 
190 (1890), this Court stated the law as follows: 
"Our statute requires actual notice and con-
structive notice is not sufficient. The demands 
of the statute are answered if a party dealing 
with the land has information of a fact or facts 
that would put a prudent man upon inquiry, and 
which would, if pursued, lead to actual knowledge 
of the state of the title; and this is actual 
notice. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§597, 598, et seq. 
The appellant was in the actual occupancy of the 
premises, and actual occupancy is enough to put 
parties dealing with the premises upon inquiry. 
Id. § 616, note 3, and § 617. But the contention 
of the respondents is that the possession of the 
appellant was consistent with the title shown by 
the record, and therefore the mortgagees were 
under no obligation to look beyond the record, and 
were authorized to consider her possession as 
under her life-estate only. On this question the 
authorities are both ways. Id. § 616, note 3, and 
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§ 617. We think the better doctrine is that an oc-
cupant's possession is actual notice of his title~ 
and all persons with notice of such possession must 
at their peril take notice of his full title in the 
premises, no difference what the record shows. Until 
the recording statutes were enacted, possession was 
notice of ownership, and a conveyance made by a 
party out of possession was void. The purpose of 
these statutes was not to change the rule that 
possession was evidence of title and notice to all 
the world of ownership, but to afford the means of 
preserving the chain of title, and give notice of 
the ownership of unoccupied lands. It would be 
an unwarranted application of the recording acts 
to say that they destroy the effect of occupancy 
as notice and evidence of ownership. We think 
therefore, that a person at his peril deals with 
or purchases real estate of one, in the possession 
of another, although said possession may be consis-
tent with the record title. It is easy to find out 
the real situation by inquiry of the party in 
possession, and it is his duty to do so. The con-
clusion, therefore, is that none of these mortgages, 
except the one for $350, were liens upon the prem-
ises of appellant." (Emphasis added) 
This case was followed in 1918 by Shafer v. Killpack, 
53 Utah 468, 173 P. 948 (1918), and by the case of Gappmeyer v. 
Wilkinson, 53 Utah 236, 177 P. 763 (1919). In the last case 
cited, the defendants Wilkinson (in the same position as the 
Severins in this case) were told before the deed was delivered 
that certain children were interested in the property to the 
extent of $3600; that the property had already been deeded to the 
children, and that there were other facts and circumstances indica-
ting that the land had been conveyed by an unrecorded deed. This 
Court held that the second deed was a nullity because the record 
showed that the grantee had such notice as would put any reasonable 
person upon inquiry to ascertain what the interest was. 
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In the more recent case of Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 
173, 91 P2d 454 (1939), this Court stated the rule as follows: 
"In 13 L.R.A., N.S., page 51, et seq. 'The 
broad rule is laid down by a large number of the 
cases, that open, notorious, unequivocal, and ex-
clusive of ownership, is constructive notice to all 
the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts, 
whether such claim is legal or equitable in its 
nature.' Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190; 
Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah 249, 26 P. 300; Neponset 
Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334, 37 P. 
573; Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 P. 983; 
Stahn v. Hall, et al, 10 Utah 400, 37 P. 585; 
Dennis v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 20 Wash. 320, 55 
P. 210. 
"The doctrine of notice of a claim of title 
to lands from possession thereof springs from the 
apparent, not the true, relation that the person 
in possession bears to the title, and rests upon 
the theory that actual and visible possession is 
a fact of such a character and notoriety as can-
not possibly escape the observancy of a subsequent 
purchaser or encumbrancer, and is in its nature 
sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the rights 
of the possessor.' Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. 
v. Dixon, supra." 
The case of Webster v. Knop, 6 Utah 2d 203, 312 P2d 557 
(1957), holds that the failure in a duty to inquire is failure of 
an element of good faith. 
In this case, Woodard went into possession of the five 
acre parcel, indicated on the ground by a pile of rocks, in 1972, 
started constructing his cabin in 1973, and finished it in 1975, 
all within the knowledge of the Severins, and is still in possession. 
This alone was enough to constitute actual notice of Woodard's 
interest and to defeat the deed as to Woodard's five acres. 
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Mr. Severin testified that Woodard had told him that 
Jensen had sold him the land. We quote: 
"Question (By Mr. Hansen): When Mr. Woodard 
started building his cabin -- strike that. Do you 
recall when Woodard started building his cabin on 
property which you claim is yours? 
"Answer: I can't give you the date, but I can 
recall a conversation when Cecil came over to get 
some water at my cabin, and I asked him why he was 
building it when it wasn't his land. 
"Question: And what did he tell you? 
"Answer: Well, that something -- well, that --
something to the effect that Brent had sold him the 
land and that it was his land. 
"Question: What did you then do? 
"Answer: Nothing. 
"Question: Did you take any action to pre-
vent him from continuing to build on the property? 
"Answer: I didn't take any action to preclude 
him from building. 
"Question: Did you ever tell him not to build? 
"Answer: It wasn't my place to tell a man not to 
build something. 
"Question: But you claim the land to be yours? 
"Answer: Right. 
"Question: You didn't tell him that he had to 
stop building his cabin? 
"Answer: No, sir. I am not in a position to 
tell a man to stop anything. 
"Question: Okay. Did you seek legal advice 
at that time? 
"Answer: No, sir. 
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"Question: You allowed him to proceed? 
"Answer: Yes, sir. I didn't — I allowed 
him to proceed to build. I didn't have any -- I 
wasn't going to start a war up on that hill." 
(R. 466,467) 
As indicated, this conversation took place when Woodard 
was building his cabin in 1973 or 1974. Severin had a duty to 
inquire about Woodardfs interest, and he did nothing. See also 
Mr. Severin's testimony about when he first met Woodard in 1972 
or 1973, (R. 453, 484) and testimony of Severin that he had 
probably met Woodard fifteen times and every time they met they 
discussed Woodard's interest in the property (R. 465,466). 
Woodardfs possession and Mr. Severin's testimony estab-
lishes actual notice of Woodard's interest. Without question the 
Severins' 1976 deed is subject to Woodard's contract right. This 
being an equity suit, the decree should include a provision 
requiring the Severins to execute and deliver to Woodard a Quit 
Claim Deed conveying to Woodard the land described in paragraph 8 
of the third amended complaint. Woodard, by his pleadings, has 
tendered the balance of the purchase price to Jensen, and, to 
complete the transaction, must pay to Jensen the balance of the 
purchase price if he gets a deed to the land from the Severins. 
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Ill, 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO REVERSE 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT FOR FAILURE TO MAKE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar 
as pertinent, provides: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the Court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A .. • •lf 
In the case of Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, 
611 P2d 392 (Utah 1980), this Court construed the above mentioned 
rule and stated the law as follows: 
"In the instant case the trial court had 
responsibility to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, notwithstanding the advisory 
verdict of a jury. Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., states 
in part: 
(The Court here quotes the above excerpt 
from Rule 52(a)). 
"This requirement is mandatory and may not 
be waived. In re Murphy's Estate, 269 Minn. 393, 
131 N.W.2d 220 (1964); 9 Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil Sections 2335, 
2574 (1971). Failure of the trial court to make 
findings of fact on all material issues is revers-
ible error. Rucker v. Dalton (Utah) 598 P.2d 
1336 (1979)." 
Piper v. Eakle, 78 Utah 342, 2 P.2d, 909 (1931). 
It will be noted that the trial court failed to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following major 
issues framed by the pleadings and tried by the court: 
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a). The mutual mistake of fact as to the legal 
description in the 1972 agreement, 
b). The intent of the parties to the agreement 
that Woodard purchased the land marked on the 
ground by a pile of rocks and outlined in cross-
hatched red on Exhibit 18-D. 
c). Whether Woodard, with the knowledge of the 
Severins, was in possession of the five-acre 
tract before 1976 when the Severins purchased 
the 56.01 acre parcel of land on which the Wood-
ard cabin is located, 
d). Whether the Severins had actual notice of 
the Woodard agreement before 1976. 
The materiality of each of the foregoing issues of fact 
is discussed at length above and will not be repeated here. 
The conclusions of law are likewise incomplete and in-
sufficient to support the judgment and are not supported by the 
findings of fact. The major issues of reformation of the 1972 
agreement, the specific enforcement thereof, and actual notice of 
the agreement by Severins are not even mentioned. 
As stated in the quotation from the case of Romrell v. 
Zions First National Bank, supra, the provisions of Rule 52(a) 
are mandatory and cannot be waived. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding and holding 
that the 1972 Agreement was conditional on the recording of a sub-
division, that the condition never happened, and that there was 
no valid contract to reform or enforce. The Court significantly 
quoted in its opinion only the parts of the Agreement which tended 
to support this conclusion, and omitted the part which sets out 
the terras of a sale. The Court, in reaching this conclusion, dis-
regarded the following facts showing the true intentions of the 
parties which are either admitted or are clearly established: 
1. Woodard paid $11,800. on a purchase price of $15,000. 
and tendered the balance. 
2. Woodard, with the help of Jensen, marked a corner of 
the unsurveyed parcel with a pile of rocks and took possession of 
the land in 1972. 
3. In 1973 and 1974, Woodard, with Jensen's help, 
partially constructed the Woodard cabin with the full knowledge of 
the Severins who acquired the land in 1976 with admitted notice of 
Woodard's possession and agreement. 
4. Jensen, who prepared the description of the five-
acre parcel, by mistake, tied it to the Southwest corner of the 
Section instead of to the West quarter corner. 
5. By their conduct, the parties to the Agreement 
treated the transaction as a firm contract of sale and not a 
conditional sale or option. 
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Further, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
judgment of the trial court, which entirely disregarded Rule 
52(a) that makes mandatory, in non-jury, civil cases, the making 
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on all material issues. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed 
and the case remanded, with directions to reform and specifically 
enforce the 1972 Agreement, to nullify the part of the 1976 deed 
to the Severins which covers the Woodard parcel, and to require 
the Severins, upon payment by Jensen of an equitable consideration, 
to execute and deliver to Woodard a deed to the five-acre parcel 
in dispute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. J. SKS™ 
50 South^Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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copies of the Brief of the Appellant to be mailed, first class 
postage prepaid, this I A ^ day of April, 1988, to the following: 
Jerrold S. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Third-Party 
Defendants-Respondents 
Mr. W. Brent Jensen 
983 Third Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 




September 21 , 1972 
A G R E E M E N T 
This agreement nade and entered into this 21st dny of September, 1972, 
by and between W. BRENT JEcISElJ, licreinaf ter referred to as Se l l e r and 
CECIL U00DA1U), hereinafter referred to as buyer, Nov, therefore, i t i s 
hereby agreed between the parties as follov;a: 
1 . I t i s agreed that the a o i l e r ia desirous of s e l l i n g and the buyer 
i s desirous of buying a parcel of ground more s p e c i f i c a l l y described as 
No. 1 #«""<? TMtHctr; „ . c / . 3C.^ *7*/ir "3«* 20'«J. &CS~/J; 5*'* 
S
'thl sa t i l r^ l so^gref s # a T t h & ^ c a l % f t f t f W X>A* i&ttitt'of 5 
acres• 
2. It io understood that Lot No, 1 ia in the process of bcinj: nade 
ready for recording with Sucroit County, Utah and cannot be sold, at this time. 
However, seller agrees that when Lot No. 1 io recorded the buyer has first 
right and option to purchase Lot No. 1. 
3. Until that time buyer agrees to buy part of Forest Meadow Kanch 
Plat C Lot £69, iaore specifically described as beginning at a point 1520 ft. 
N, 512 ft. E. from if.W. Cor. Soc. 27, TIN, W E , SLB&M and running thence: 
N31* 42f 41° E. 144.59 ft.; K 83° 43*44" E., 183.10 ft.; N. 09* 27* 44" U., 
60.83 .ft.; W. 73* 28' 27" E, 94.92 ft; South 320 ft., to point of beginning, 
hereinafter referred to a6 Lot Mo. 2. At the time Lot No. 1 is recorded 
the buyer will release the right and interest in Lot Mo. 2, and vill exercise 
his option on Lot No. 1. 
4. The seller agrees to provide cullinary water to Lot No. 1 through a 
central water oysteia. 
5. Tne seller warrants to the buyer that a properly installed septic 
tank systen will meet all county and atate rcquircnents for oewage disposal 
and no acceosnvent will bo cade for a sewage hook-u/. 
6. Terms of the sale. The buyer agrees to pay $7,000,00 in canh and 
8,000 shares of Adak Energy Corporation stock hereinafter referred to on the 
Stock. The seller acknowledges the stock is Investment stock and at the 
present time is not tradable. The seller agrees that the stock will be 
held in escrow in the sellers nana at the waiu office of Walker Bank & Trust, 
Salt Lake City, Utah until caid etock becomes free trading. The buyer 
guarantees to tho seller that the stock will havo a market value of $1 per 
flharc oa or before October 1, 1974, and that the seller vill be able to 
sell through a broker the stock for $1 a share. The buyer retains an 
optioa to purchase back the said stock for §1 per share on or before October.1, 
1974. 
7. Hie seller hereby agrees to furnish to the buyor Title Xucutaacc 
to the property no later than October 1, 1974 
Seller '"'/Us, 7^^/^/^yb^^^<^^ 
W. Brent Jeus^a 
M, j.'P Z/AjUk Buyo 
Cecil Woodard-
Beginning at a point North, 660 ft. end Cast, 520 ft. from the S.W, 
comer aec. 28, tin, R4E, SLB&« and running hence H 61 * 30' £, 670 ft.; 
U 30° 001 W, 330 ft,; S. 61° 20« W, 665 ft.I S 76° 30» Z> 170 ft. ; 
S 46° 401 E, 60 ft..; South, 60 ft.; S 18° 3Q» W, 130 ft, to the point 
-of beginning. 
Seller &/¥&£&' &rt&*<~^'' 






December 08, 1972 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
December 08, 1972 
For Value received, I promise to pay Cecil Woodard $4,800.00 with 
interest payable November 1, 1974, at the rate of 1% per annum. In 
consideration for this loan, I agree to do the following items for 
Cecil Woodard!s cabin: 
1. dig and pour footings 
2. dig basement 
3. cut driveway 
4. install septic tank 
5. to pay for all the materials and labor to cover the cost of 
items 1,2,3,4 
6. The items mentioned above must be done on or before July 1, 1973 




UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CASE NO. 860037-CA 
Filed July 27, 1987 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Cecil Woodard/ 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v. 
W. Brent Jensen 
Defendant and Third-Party/ 
Plaintiff/ 
v. 
Richard Severin and 
Mrs. Richard Severin# 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
Before Judges Garff# Bench and Jackson. ~ r- -
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerl; of the Court 
U t a
^ Court of Appeals 
BENCH, Judge: 
Cecil Woodard appeals a trial court judgment quieting 
title in Richard and Donna Severin to a five acre parcel of 
property. We affirm. 
In 1972/ Woodard met with a developer/ W. Brent Jensen, 
to discuss the purchase by plaintiff of five acres of mountain 
property, owned by Jensen# as a cabin site. They agreed on a 
parcel and marked a corner with a pile of rocks. On September 
21/ 1972/ Woodard and Jensen executed a written agreement/ 
prepared by them/ which states in pertinent part: 
This agreement made and entered into 
this 21st day of September/ 19729 by and 
between W. BRENT JENSEN/ hereinafter 
referred to as Seller and CECIL WOODARD/ 
hereinafter referred to as buyer. Now, 
therefore, it is hereby agreed between the 
parties as follows: 
OPINION 
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1. It is agreed that the seller is 
desirous of selling and the buyer is 
desirous of buying a parcel of ground more 
specifically described as 
[a metes and bounds legal description 
is written in by hand]• 
The seller also agrees that this parcel of 
land will be a minimum of 5 acres• 
2. It is understood that Lot No. 1 is in 
the process of being made ready for 
recording with Summit County, Utah and 
cannot be sold at this time. However, 
seller agrees that when Lot No. 1 is 
recorded the buyer has first right and 
option to purchase Lot No. 1. 
3. Until that time buyer agrees to buy 
part of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat C Lot 
#69, more specifically described as 
[legal description typed in] 
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2. At 
the time Lot No. 1 is recorded the buyer 
will release the right and interest in Lot 
No. 2, and will exercise his option on Lot 
No. 1. 
* * * 
7. The Seller hereby agrees to furnish to 
buyer Title Insurance to the property no 
later than October 1, 1974. 
The handwritten legal description in paragraph one was entered 
by Jensen a day or two after execution of the agreement. 
Approximately one week later, Jensen typed in a legal 
description of the property at the end of the second page of 
the agreement and the two men again executed the agreement. 
Both descriptions erroneously described a five acre parcel 
south of the property Woodard selected which Jensen did not 
even own. 
Woodard paid Jensen $7,000.00 cash and delivered 6,000 
shares of stock to him as a down payment on the property. 
Woodard also delivered to Jensen title to a truck as partial 
payment and in exchange for Jensen's agreement to dig the 
footings and basement for the cabin. In August, 1973, despite 
having no title yet in the property, Woodard began construction 
of his cabin on the five acre parcel of property he had 
selected. 
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Meanwhile/ and also in August, 1973, Jensen conveyed a 
17.59 acre parcel, just south of Woodard*s cabin, to Richard 
and Donna Severin. The Severins also began construction oi a 
cabin that month• The parties met occasionally and discussed 
their cabins. At one time, Richard Severin asked Woodard why 
he was building on land he did not own. Woodard told Severin 
he had an agreement with Jensen to purchase the property. 
Jensen conveyed additional property to the Severins on November 
22, 1974. 
On December 10, 1974, Woodard filed a complaint against 
Jensen seeking specific performance of the agreement and 
execution of a warranty deed to the property described in 
paragraph one and at the bottom of page two. In his answer 
filed January 7, 1975, Jensen admitted he sold to Woodard the 
property in paragraph three and further gave him a first right 
and option to purchase other property when recorded. Woodard 
filed an amended complaint adding an alternative remedy of 
money damages in light of Jensen*s possible inability to 
fulfill the condition of recording under the agreement* 
On July 30, 1976, Jensen, through Security Title Company, 
conveyed 56 acres to the Severins by special warranty deed. 
This acreage encompasses the prior two conveyances from Jensen 
to the Severins plus most of the five acres claimed by 
Woodard. On December 27, 1977, Jensen again through Security 
Title Company conveyed ten more acres to the Severins which 
encompasses the remainder of the property claimed by Woodard. 
At a pre-trial conference between Woodard and Jensen, the 
parties realized the mutual mistake committed in the 
description of the property. The trial court authorized Jensen 
to file a third-party complaint against the Severins to rescind 
the five acre portion of the deed claimed by Woodard. Jensen 
filed his third-party complaint on July 6, 1979 which was later 
dismissed by the court. 
Woodard filed a second amended complaint on April 11, 1980, 
increasing the requested damages. Then, on October 17, 1980, 
he filed a third amended complaint alleging for the first time 
mutual mistake in the original agreement. Woodard offered a 
substitute legal description of the property and requested 
reformation and specific performance of the agreement and an 
order requiring the Severins to execute and deliver a quitclaim 
deed to the disputed five acres. In the alternative, Woodard 
requested $63,500.00 in damages. 
Trial was held July 8 and 9, 1982. The court found the 
1972 agreement was not a conveyance of title to the property 
and that the Severins were, through a series of recorded 
conveyances, the record title owners of the disputed property. 
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Woodard was held to have no right, title, or interest in said 
property and was, therefore, estopped to claim specific 
performance of the agreement or a deed to the property* As 
between Woodard and Jensen, the court ordered Jensen to pay him 
$25,300.00 in damages, the value of the property with 
improvements ($28,500.00) less the balance due on the agreed 
price ($3,200.00). 
On appeal, Woodard argues the trial court erred in ignoring 
in its findings, conclusions, and judgment the following 
determinative issues: reformation of the agreement, admitted 
mutual mistake, specific performance of the reformed agreement, 
possession of the land by Woodard, and actual notice of the 
Severins. He asks this Court to reverse the judgment and 
remand with instructions to reform and specifically enforce the 
agreement against the Severins. 
The equitable remedies of reformation and specific 
performance are not available in the instant case. As Woodard 
and Jensen discussed the purchase and sale of the property, 
Jensen informed him the contract he had with the original 
sellers prohibited conveyances of less than ten acres unless 
the property was in a recorded subdivision. The parties 
incorporated this condition into the agreement: 
2. It is understood that Lot No. 1 is in 
the process of being made ready for 
recording with Summit County, Utah and 
cannot be sold at this time. However, 
seller agrees that when Lot No. 1 is 
recorded the buyer has first right and 
option to purchase Lot No. 1. 
3. Until that time buyer agrees to buy 
part of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat C Lot 
#69, more specifically described as 
[legal description typed in] 
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2. At 
the time Lot No. 1 is recorded the buyer 
will release the right and interest in Lot 
No. 2, and will exercise his option on Lot 
No. 1. (Emphasis added.) 
However, subsequent to execution of the agreement, Jensen 
discovered Summit County had changed its requirements for 
recording recreational property. The new requirements, as 
Jensen understood them, made it impossible for him to subdivide 
and record Woodardfs desired property. 
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Both before and after October 1, 1974/ the date by which 
Jensen was to furnish title insurance to Woodard/ Jensen told 
Woodard that because he was unable to record the subdivision-/ 
he could not convey the property. He suggested various 
alternatives, all of which Woodard rejected. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled where a certain event or 
situation is essentially made a condition to an agreement/ the 
absence of such event or situation precludes specific 
performance of the agreement. BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 
456 (Utah 1978). In the instant case, recording was clearly a 
condition precedent to Jensen*s duty to offer a first right and 
option to purchase the property under the agreement. As the 
condition precedent of the agreement has not been fulfilled/ 
the equitable remedies of reformation and specific performance 
of the agreement are not available to Woodard. 
We therefore affirm the judgment. 
Russell W. Bench/ Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff/ Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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